Lateral Movement Detection Hunt (Example: PsExec/WMI)

Lateral Movement Detection Hunt (Example: PsExec/WMI)#

Objective#

Proactively hunt for signs of lateral movement using common administrative tools like PsExec or WMI abuse, which attackers often leverage.

Scope#

This runbook provides a template for hunting specific lateral movement TTPs, focusing on PsExec and WMI examples using SIEM queries.

Inputs#

  • ${TIME_FRAME_HOURS}: Lookback period in hours for SIEM searches (default: 72).

  • (Optional) ${TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY}: A UDM query fragment to narrow the scope (e.g., principal.hostname = "server1" or target.hostname = "domain_controller").

  • (Optional) ${HUNT_HYPOTHESIS}: Brief description of the reason for the hunt (e.g., “Hunting for PsExec usage originating from non-admin workstations”).

Tools#

  • secops-mcp: get_threat_intel (for technique understanding), search_security_events (core hunting tool), lookup_entity (for enriching findings).

  • secops-soar: post_case_comment (for documenting hunt/findings), list_cases (optional, check related cases).

  • gti-mcp: (Used for enriching findings if IOCs are discovered).

  • (Optional: Identity Provider tools like okta-mcp.lookup_okta_user)

  • Common Steps: common_steps/find_relevant_soar_case.md

Workflow Steps & Diagram#

  1. Receive Input & Define Scope: Obtain ${TIME_FRAME_HOURS}, optionally ${TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY} and ${HUNT_HYPOTHESIS}.

  2. Research Techniques (SIEM/External):

    • Use secops-mcp.get_threat_intel for TTPs like T1570 (Lateral Tool Transfer - PsExec often copied), T1021.002 (Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares - PsExec uses this), T1047 (Windows Management Instrumentation - WMI abuse).

    • (Manual Step: Review MITRE ATT&CK website for detailed procedures and detection guidance for these techniques).

  3. Develop SIEM Hunt Queries:

    • Based on research, formulate specific secops-mcp.search_security_events UDM queries targeting indicators. Examples:

      • PsExec Service Installation: metadata.product_event_type = "ServiceInstalled" AND target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "PSEXESVC.exe" (Requires appropriate Windows Event Log source - System Log Event ID 7045).

      • PsExec Execution (Indirect): Look for services.exe spawning unusual processes, especially on remote machines shortly after potential SMB connection. metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND principal.process.file.full_path = "C:\Windows\System32\services.exe" AND target.process.file.full_path NOT IN ("standard_service_process1.exe", "standard_service_process2.exe") (Needs significant tuning based on environment).

      • WMI Process Creation: metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND principal.process.file.full_path = "C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe" (Look for WmiPrvSE.exe spawning suspicious child processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe).

      • WMI Command-Line Execution: metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND principal.process.file.full_path = "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" AND principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "wmic" AND principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "/node:" AND principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "process call create"

      • WMI Event Subscription (Persistence T1546.003): Search for events related to __EventFilter, __EventConsumer, __FilterToConsumerBinding creation/modification (Requires specific WMI event logging or EDR visibility). Example: metadata.event_type = "WMI_ACTIVITY" AND description CONTAINS "__EventFilter"

      • PowerShell WMI Methods: Search for PowerShell scripts (.ps1) or command lines using Invoke-WmiMethod, Get-WmiObject, or Invoke-CimMethod for remote interaction. Example: metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "powershell.exe" AND target.process.command_line CONTAINS "Invoke-WmiMethod"

    • Combine technique-specific queries with ${TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY} if provided.

  4. Execute SIEM Searches:

    • Run the developed queries using secops-mcp.search_security_events with hours_back=${TIME_FRAME_HOURS}.

  5. Network Correlation (Optional but Recommended):

    • If suspicious process activity is found on a target host, search for corresponding network connections (especially SMB port 445) originating from potential source hosts around the same time.

    • Example Query: metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_CONNECTION" AND target.port = 445 AND target.ip = "TARGET_IP" AND principal.ip = "SOURCE_IP" (Adjust IPs and timeframe based on findings).

  6. Analyze Results:

    • Review results for anomalous patterns: PsExec/WMI usage originating from unexpected sources (e.g., user workstations instead of admin servers), execution targeting a large number of hosts, execution of suspicious commands via WMI, correlation between network connections and remote process execution.

  7. Enrich Findings:

    • If suspicious activity is found: * Use secops-mcp.lookup_entity for involved source/destination hosts, users. Let these be SUSPICIOUS_ENTITIES. * (Optional) If an Identity Provider tool is available (e.g., okta-mcp.lookup_okta_user), gather context on involved user accounts. * Use gti-mcp tools to enrich any associated IPs, domains, or hashes if applicable. Let combined enrichment be ENRICHMENT_RESULTS.

  8. Check Related SOAR Cases:

    • If SUSPICIOUS_ENTITIES were identified:

      • Execute common_steps/find_relevant_soar_case.md with SEARCH_TERMS=SUSPICIOUS_ENTITIES and CASE_STATUS_FILTER="Opened".

      • Obtain ${RELATED_SOAR_CASES} (list of potentially relevant open case summaries/IDs).

  9. Document Hunt & Findings:

    • Use secops-soar.post_case_comment in a dedicated hunting case or relevant existing case.

    • Document: Hunt Hypothesis/Objective, Techniques Hunted, Scope, Timeframe, Queries Used, Summary of Findings (explicitly noting queries with negative results), Details of suspicious activity, Enrichment results (ENRICHMENT_RESULTS), Related SOAR Cases (${RELATED_SOAR_CASES}).

    • Suggest Follow-on Actions: Based on findings, suggest next steps like triggering case_event_timeline_and_process_analysis.md for suspicious processes or compromised_user_account_response.md for involved users.

  10. Escalate or Conclude:

    • If confirmed lateral movement or tool abuse is found, escalate by creating a new incident case or linking findings to an existing one.

    • If no significant findings, conclude the hunt and document it thoroughly.

  11. Completion: Conclude the runbook execution.

        sequenceDiagram
    participant Analyst
    participant AutomatedAgent as Automated Agent (MCP Client)
    participant SecOpsMCP as secops-mcp
    participant SOAR as secops-soar
    participant MITRE as MITRE ATT&CK (External)
    participant IDP as Identity Provider (Optional)
    participant GTI as gti-mcp
    participant FindCase as common_steps/find_relevant_soar_case.md

    Analyst->>AutomatedAgent: Start Lateral Movement Hunt (PsExec/WMI)\nInput: TIME_FRAME_HOURS, TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY (opt), HUNT_HYPOTHESIS (opt)

    %% Step 2: Research Techniques
    AutomatedAgent->>SecOpsMCP: get_threat_intel(query="MITRE T1021.002")
    SecOpsMCP-->>AutomatedAgent: Technique Context
    AutomatedAgent->>SecOpsMCP: get_threat_intel(query="MITRE T1047")
    SecOpsMCP-->>AutomatedAgent: Technique Context
    AutomatedAgent->>MITRE: (Manual) Review ATT&CK Website
    MITRE-->>AutomatedAgent: Detailed Procedures/Detections

    %% Step 3: Develop SIEM Queries
    Note over AutomatedAgent: Formulate UDM queries for PsExec/WMI indicators (incl. new WMI examples)

    %% Step 4: Execute SIEM Searches
    loop For each developed Query Qi
        AutomatedAgent->>SecOpsMCP: search_security_events(text=Qi, hours_back=TIME_FRAME_HOURS)
        SecOpsMCP-->>AutomatedAgent: Search Results for Qi
    end

    %% Step 5: Network Correlation (Optional)
    opt Suspicious Activity Found
        Note over AutomatedAgent: Construct Network Correlation Query Qn
        AutomatedAgent->>SecOpsMCP: search_security_events(text=Qn, hours_back=...)
        SecOpsMCP-->>AutomatedAgent: Network Correlation Results
    end

    %% Step 6: Analyze Results
    Note over AutomatedAgent: Analyze results for anomalous PsExec/WMI usage & correlations

    %% Step 7: Enrich Findings
    opt Suspicious Activity Found
        Note over AutomatedAgent: Identify SUSPICIOUS_ENTITIES (H1, U1...)
        loop For each Suspicious Entity Ei
            AutomatedAgent->>SecOpsMCP: lookup_entity(entity_value=Ei)
            SecOpsMCP-->>AutomatedAgent: SIEM Summary for Ei
            opt IDP Tool Available and Ei is User
                AutomatedAgent->>IDP: lookup_user(user=Ei)
                IDP-->>AutomatedAgent: User IDP Context
            end
            %% Potentially enrich related IOCs if found
            opt IOCs Found (I1, I2...)
                 loop For each IOC Ii
                     AutomatedAgent->>GTI: get_..._report(ioc=Ii)
                     GTI-->>AutomatedAgent: GTI Report for Ii
                 end
            end
        end
        Note over AutomatedAgent: Store combined enrichment (ENRICHMENT_RESULTS)
    end

    %% Step 8: Check Related SOAR Cases
    opt Suspicious Activity Found
        AutomatedAgent->>FindCase: Execute(Input: SEARCH_TERMS=SUSPICIOUS_ENTITIES, CASE_STATUS_FILTER="Opened")
        FindCase-->>AutomatedAgent: Results: RELATED_SOAR_CASES
    end

    %% Step 9: Document Hunt
    Note over AutomatedAgent: Prepare hunt summary comment (incl. negative results, related cases & suggested follow-ons)
    AutomatedAgent->>SOAR: post_case_comment(case_id=[Hunt Case/Relevant Case], comment="Lateral Movement Hunt (PsExec/WMI) Summary: Scope [...], Queries [...], Findings [...], Enrichment [...], Related Cases: [...], Follow-on: [...]")
    SOAR-->>AutomatedAgent: Comment Confirmation

    %% Step 10 & 11: Escalate or Conclude
    alt Confirmed Malicious Activity Found
        Note over AutomatedAgent: Escalate findings (Create new case or link to existing)
        AutomatedAgent->>Analyst: attempt_completion(result="Lateral Movement Hunt complete. Findings escalated.")
    else No Significant Findings
        AutomatedAgent->>Analyst: attempt_completion(result="Lateral Movement Hunt complete. No significant findings. Hunt documented.")
    end
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