Compromised User Account Incident Response Plan (IRP) / Runbook#
Objective#
Provide a structured workflow for responding to incidents involving a potentially compromised user account (e.g., identified via impossible travel alerts, credential stuffing, successful phishing, etc.), coordinating investigation, containment, eradication, and recovery efforts.
Scope#
This runbook covers the end-to-end response lifecycle for compromised user account incidents. It relies on specific sub-runbooks or steps for detailed execution.
Phases (PICERL Model)#
Preparation: (Ongoing) Ensure tools are operational, relevant detections are active, identity provider access is available, and communication/escalation plans are clear.
Identification: Detect the potential compromise, perform initial triage, analyze user activity, and assess likelihood.
Containment: Limit the impact by disabling the account, resetting passwords, or terminating sessions.
Eradication: Remove any attacker persistence related to the compromised account (e.g., malicious OAuth apps, forwarding rules). Investigate actions taken by the compromised account.
Recovery: Restore the user account to normal operation safely.
Lessons Learned (Post-Incident): Review the incident and response to identify improvements.
Inputs#
${USER_ID}
: The identifier of the potentially compromised user (e.g., username, email address).${CASE_ID}
: The relevant SOAR case ID for documentation.${ALERT_GROUP_IDENTIFIERS}
: Relevant alert group identifiers from the SOAR case.(Optional)
${INITIAL_ALERT_DETAILS}
: Summary of the alert that triggered this runbook.
Tools#
secops-mcp
:search_security_events
,lookup_entity
secops-soar
:post_case_comment
,get_case_full_details
(Potentially Identity Provider tools like
okta-mcp
if available:lookup_okta_user
,disable_okta_user
,reset_okta_user_password
,terminate_sessions
, etc.)You may ask follow up question (To confirm actions)
(Potentially Email platform tools for checking rules/delegation)
(Potentially Endpoint tools if investigating actions taken on hosts)
Common Steps:
common_steps/check_duplicate_cases.md
,common_steps/find_relevant_soar_case.md
,common_steps/document_in_soar.md
,common_steps/confirm_action.md
Workflow Steps & Diagram#
sequenceDiagram participant Analyst participant IRP as compromised_user_account_response.md (This Runbook) participant Preparation as Phase 1: Preparation participant Identification as Phase 2: Identification participant Containment as Phase 3: Containment participant Eradication as Phase 4: Eradication participant Recovery as Phase 5: Recovery participant LessonsLearned as Phase 6: Lessons Learned Analyst->>IRP: Start Compromised User Account Response\nInput: USER_ID, CASE_ID, ALERT_GROUP_IDS, INITIAL_ALERT_DETAILS (opt) IRP->>Preparation: Verify Prerequisites (Ongoing) Preparation-->>IRP: Readiness Confirmed (Tools, Detections, Plans) IRP->>Identification: Execute Identification Steps Identification-->>IRP: Findings (Suspicious Activity, Likelihood Assessment) IRP->>Containment: Execute Containment Steps Containment-->>IRP: Containment Status (Account Disabled/Reset/Sessions Terminated) IRP->>Eradication: Execute Eradication Steps Eradication-->>IRP: Eradication Status (Persistence Removed, Actions Investigated) IRP->>Recovery: Execute Recovery Steps Recovery-->>IRP: Recovery Status (Account Restored) IRP->>LessonsLearned: Execute Post-Incident Steps LessonsLearned-->>IRP: Review Complete IRP-->>Analyst: Incident Response Complete
Phase 1: Preparation (Ongoing)#
Objective: Ensure readiness to respond to compromised account incidents.
Actions:
Verify tool connectivity (SIEM, SOAR, IDP).
Ensure relevant detections for suspicious logins, impossible travel, credential stuffing, etc., are active.
Maintain access credentials and procedures for Identity Provider actions (disable, reset, session termination).
Review and understand communication and escalation plans (
.agentrules/escalation_paths.md
).
Phase 2: Identification#
Objective: Detect the potential compromise, perform initial triage, analyze user activity, and assess likelihood.
Sub-Runbooks/Steps:
Receive Input & Context: Obtain
${USER_ID}
,${CASE_ID}
,${ALERT_GROUP_IDENTIFIERS}
, and optionally${INITIAL_ALERT_DETAILS}
. Get case details viasecops-soar.get_case_full_details
. Check for duplicates (../common_steps/check_duplicate_cases.md
).Gather Initial Context:
Use
secops-mcp.lookup_entity
for${USER_ID}
to get a quick summary of recent activity in SIEM.(Optional: Use
okta-mcp.lookup_okta_user
or similar identity tool for${USER_ID}
to get account status, recent logins, MFA details etc.)
Analyze User Activity:
Perform detailed searches in SIEM using
secops-mcp.search_security_events
for${USER_ID}
covering the relevant timeframe (e.g., last 24-72 hours). Look for:Anomalous login locations/times/IPs/User Agents.
Suspicious command-line activity on associated endpoints.
Access to sensitive resources (files, applications, databases).
Evidence of lateral movement (e.g., logins to other systems using this account).
Large data transfers or exfiltration patterns.
Failed login attempts followed by success.
Changes to account settings (MFA, recovery email/phone, forwarding rules).
Creation/modification of OAuth application grants.
Check Related SOAR Cases:
Execute
../common_steps/find_relevant_soar_case.md
withSEARCH_TERMS=["${USER_ID}"]
andCASE_STATUS_FILTER="Opened"
.Obtain
${RELATED_SOAR_CASES}
(list of potentially relevant open case summaries/IDs).
Assess Compromise Likelihood: Based on the initial alert, context, activity analysis, and
${RELATED_SOAR_CASES}
, determine the likelihood of compromise (Low, Medium, High, Confirmed).Document Identification Phase: Document findings (including
${RELATED_SOAR_CASES}
) using../common_steps/document_in_soar.md
.
Phase 3: Containment#
Objective: Limit the impact of the compromise by restricting the attacker’s access.
Sub-Runbooks/Steps:
Confirm Containment Actions: Use
../common_steps/confirm_action.md
to confirm with the analyst which containment actions (e.g., disable account, reset password, terminate sessions) should be taken based on the likelihood assessment. Prioritize based on risk.Execute Containment:
(Requires specific Identity Provider integration tools)
If confirmed, execute actions like:
Disable user account (e.g.,
okta-mcp.disable_okta_user
).Reset user password (force change on next login) (e.g.,
okta-mcp.reset_okta_user_password
).Terminate active sessions (e.g.,
okta-mcp.terminate_sessions
).
Verify Containment: Monitor SIEM/IDP logs for further activity from the account or associated sessions.
Document Containment: Document actions taken and verification status using
../common_steps/document_in_soar.md
.
Phase 4: Eradication#
Objective: Remove any attacker persistence mechanisms tied to the account and investigate actions taken while compromised.
Sub-Runbooks/Steps:
Investigate Attacker Actions:
Thoroughly review SIEM logs (
secops-mcp.search_security_events
) for all actions performed by the${USER_ID}
during the suspected compromise window (identified in Phase 2). Focus on access to sensitive data, lateral movement attempts, configuration changes, emails sent/received.(Requires Email Platform tools) Check for malicious email forwarding rules, delegate access changes, or malicious emails sent from the account.
(Requires Cloud Platform tools) Check for creation of malicious OAuth applications or other persistence in connected cloud services.
(Requires Endpoint tools) If the account was used to access specific endpoints, trigger endpoint investigation (e.g.,
../basic_endpoint_triage_isolation.md
or deeper forensics) to look for malware or persistence.
Remove Persistence:
Remove any identified persistence mechanisms (e.g., delete forwarding rules, revoke malicious OAuth apps).
Document Eradication: Document investigation findings and eradication steps using
../common_steps/document_in_soar.md
.
Phase 5: Recovery#
Objective: Restore the user account to normal operation safely.
Sub-Runbooks/Steps:
Ensure Threat Removed: Confirm eradication steps are complete and associated endpoint threats (if any) are handled.
Secure Account: Ensure password has been reset and MFA is appropriately configured. Review account recovery options.
Re-enable Account (If Disabled): (Requires IDP tools) Re-enable the account if it was disabled during containment.
Communicate with User: Inform the user about the incident (as appropriate), the actions taken, and any necessary steps they need to take.
Monitor Account: Closely monitor the account’s activity for a period post-recovery using SIEM/IDP logs.
Document Recovery: Document steps taken using
../common_steps/document_in_soar.md
.
Phase 6: Lessons Learned (Post-Incident)#
Objective: Review the incident and response to identify areas for improvement.
Sub-Runbooks/Steps: (Placeholder - Requires dedicated Post-Incident Runbook)
Incident Review Meeting: Discuss the initial access vector (if known), detection method, response effectiveness, and recovery process.
Analyze Response: Review timeline, tool effectiveness, runbook adherence.
Identify Gaps: Focus on prevention (e.g., MFA effectiveness, phishing awareness), detection (e.g., login anomaly tuning), and response gaps.
Develop Recommendations: Suggest improvements (e.g., security control changes, new detections, user training).
Update Documentation: Update runbooks, policies, etc.
Track Recommendations: Assign and track implementation.
Final Report: Generate using guidelines from
rules-bank/reporting_templates.md
and../report_writing.md
.Document Review: Document outcomes using
../common_steps/document_in_soar.md
.
Phase 7: Lessons Learned / Runbook Feedback#
Objective: Capture feedback on the runbook’s effectiveness and identify areas for improvement based on this incident.
Actions:
Runbook Effectiveness:
Did this runbook accurately guide the response?
Were there any unclear or missing steps?
Did the tools function as expected based on the runbook steps?
Tool Performance:
Were there any issues with specific MCP tool calls (errors, unexpected results, rate limits)?
Did the tool outputs provide the necessary information?
Process Gaps:
Did the incident reveal gaps in detection, prevention, or other related processes?
Suggestions for Improvement:
Specific recommendations for updating this runbook.
Suggestions for new detection rules or tuning existing ones.
Recommendations for tool configuration changes or new tool requirements.
Documentation: Record this feedback within the SOAR case (
${CASE_ID}
) usingcommon_steps/document_in_soar.md
or a dedicated lessons learned repository.